Important NOTE: Beware of the fake website finanzforensik.com — officially only under finanz-forensik.de. Registered at Hanau District Court, HRB 100521.
Important NOTE: Beware of the fake website finanzforensik.com — officially only under finanz-forensik.de. Registered at Hanau District Court, HRB 100521.
How criminal infrastructures really work — and how to trace cryptocurrencies, uncover wallet clusters and secure assets.
Whitepaper
Conclusions drawn from several hundred cryptoforensic investigations conducted by Finanz Forensik GmbH, supplemented by publicly available sources—no independent statistical analysis. Case studies are anonymized or constructed for illustrative purposes ("illustrative placeholder") and do not allow for conclusions to be drawn about actual cases.
Four victims, one shared wallet. Independent payment flows converge at the cash-out point — this is precisely what makes perpetrator infrastructures forensically vulnerable.
Cryptocurrency fraud has evolved from occasional isolated incidents into a highly organized business model with a division of labor. While previously it was carried out by individual perpetrators with limited technical knowledge, today it involves specialized, sometimes industrial-scale structures: individuals who acquire victims (fake investment platforms, romance or "pig butchering" contacts, social media advertising), individuals who operate the technical infrastructure (wallets, collection points, cross-chain transfers), and individuals who specialize exclusively in cashing out in fiat currency.
This division of labor complicates traditional investigative approaches that target a single responsible person. At the same time, it opens up new forensic avenues: Where there is a division of labor, there are also interfaces—and interfaces leave traces that can be made visible through blockchain analysis and wallet clustering.
According to Chainalysis' 2026 Crypto Crime Report, at least $14 billion in on-chain cryptocurrency fraud was proven worldwide in 2025; after full retrospective analysis, this figure is expected to exceed $17 billion—up from approximately $9.9 billion the previous year. The average loss per fraud payment increased from $782 (2024) to $2,764 (2025)—an increase of 253 TW (1 TP3T). Impersonation fraud grew by approximately 1,400 TW (1 TP3T), driven by AI deepfakes.
General cybercrime in Germany is also at an all-time high: The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered around 334,000 cases of cybercrime in the narrower sense for 2025, with total damages estimated by Bitkom at €202.4 billion; a good 62 million of these crimes were committed from abroad or from unknown locations. The BKA does not maintain separate, comprehensive statistics on crypto-related damages—which further exacerbates the problem of unreported cases. Many cases go unreported due to shame or the mistaken assumption that blockchain technology is anonymous.
The industrial scale of these structures is exemplified by the Cambodian Huione Group, which, according to Chainalysis data, processed more than $98 billion in crypto assets and laundered at least $4 billion from illegal sources over a period of approximately four and a half years before US authorities cut off the network's access to the financial system. The chairman of the "Prince Group" was indicted for operating forced-labor scam compounds. Professionalization in this context does not mean greater anonymity—on the contrary: the more standardized an infrastructure is, the more recurring its patterns become.
Traditional approaches focus on the identity of a person: Who opened the account, who operated the website, who was behind the number. This approach is ineffective for internationally operating, specialized groups because the contact person, the technical infrastructure, and the cash-out point are attributable to different actors, often located in different jurisdictions.
A public blockchain is not an anonymous space, but a pseudonymous and completely transparent one. Every transaction is permanent, immutable, and auditable. What's missing is not the history, but the mapping of an address to a real identity. This is precisely where professional analysis comes in—by combining on-chain patterns (clustering, time correlation, balance sheet analysis) with off-chain information (KYC data, OSINT, information requests)—ideally leading to a concrete cash-out account.
In almost all cases investigated by Finanz Forensik GmbH, the perpetrator's infrastructure left behind more usable traces than the initial contact with the victim. While fake websites, phone numbers, and chat accounts are quickly deleted, the wallet structures used remain permanently and immutably traceable on the blockchain.
To understand the infrastructure of professional criminals, it is helpful to examine the typical path of funds from the victim to their conversion into fiat currency as a process. This lifecycle repeats itself—with variations in detail—in the majority of the cases studied and forms the basis of any subsequent wallet analysis.
Phase 1 — Bank transfer. The fraud begins outside the blockchain, with a bank transfer or card payment to a cryptocurrency exchange. Forensically, this is the easiest phase to document (bank statement + KYC data from the exchange). The date, amount, recipient's IBAN, and purpose of payment form the link to on-chain analysis.
Phase 2 — Exchange. The fiat deposit is exchanged for cryptocurrency and forwarded to a perpetrator's wallet. This is the last point with a direct, KYC-enforced link between a real person (victim) and a blockchain address before the funds enter the perpetrator's infrastructure.
Phase 3 — Receiving wallet and layering. The receiving wallet is usually only the first stage in a multi-stage forwarding process (layering) designed to make tracing more difficult and to tire out tracing tools. In practice, however, layering patterns are characteristic and recognizable.
Phase 4 — Pooled wallets and clusters. Funds from multiple layering chains—often from several victim cases—converge in a limited number of pooled wallets. This consolidation makes economic sense from the perpetrator's perspective and is the most important starting point for wallet clustering from a forensic point of view.
Phase 5 — Cash-Out. The final step is conversion into fiat currency or a marketable form (real estate, luxury goods, OTC resale). The cash-out is the most vulnerable point because it regularly involves a regulated entity subject to KYC (Chapter 7).
Professional crypto scammers rarely work with a single wallet. They operate complete, reusable systems of receiving, intermediary, and collection wallets, supplemented by exchange accounts, stablecoin routes, and OTC contacts—the actual subject of any serious wallet analysis.
| Building block | Function within the perpetrator infrastructure |
|---|---|
| Receiving wallets | First on-chain station after the Exchange; often regenerated for each victim/campaign. Marks the unique starting point of a case; can be linked to others via time correlation. |
| Intermediate wallets / Layering | Pure obfuscation; multiple redirects at short intervals, some with equally sized partial amounts ("peeling"/"splitting"). Automated scripting leaves regular patterns in seconds/minutes. |
| Collection wallets | Organizational center; this is where funds from many cases converge. If funds from several independent victims flow into this center, it is strong evidence of joint perpetration. |
| Exchange accounts | Without a cash-out channel, crypto assets are worthless. This is structurally necessary — and the point at which KYC/AML/information requests are most effective. |
| Cross-Chain Bridges | Transfers between blockchains complicate analysis. Modern platforms (e.g., Crystal Intelligence) now fully map cross-chain transactions. |
| Stablecoins (USDT/USDC) | Preferred for pooled wallets/cash-out (no price fluctuations). Approximately 84 TP3T of illegal inflows in 2025 — issuer cooperation (freeze/disclosure) increases traceability. |
| OTC broker | Over-the-counter exchange of large sums, sometimes without KYC. Preferred cash-out route — an area with regulatory catching-up. |
Offender infrastructures are generally reused multiple times because setting them up—especially acquiring functioning exchange and OTC access—is extremely costly for the perpetrators themselves. This reuse is the key lever in forensic investigations: A single identified component often leads to further, previously unknown victims.
The building blocks explain what a criminal infrastructure consists of—not why it looks the way it does. The answer lies in economics: Professional fraudsters operate like entrepreneurs. They minimize effort, optimize costs, and automate where it's worthwhile. This business logic gives rise to the recurring patterns that forensic analysis makes visible in the first place.
A common misconception is that perpetrators exploit every technically possible means of concealment. In practice, infrastructures are only as complex as the case economically requires—no more so. Additional layering, cross-chain jumps, or intermediate wallets cost time, gas fees, and increase the probability of errors. Perpetrators stop where the marginal effort outweighs the marginal benefit.
Building a functioning infrastructure is costly: generating wallets, configuring layering scripts, testing cross-chain routes, and, most importantly, acquiring exchange/OTC access—often with forged identity documents, credible account histories, and OTC contacts. This effort only pays off over multiple uses. The rational consequence: repeated use of the same shared wallets, exchange accounts, and OTC contacts across numerous victims.
Creating a new wallet address is technically practically free—yet existing intermediate and pooled wallets are reused. The reason lies in the operational complexity: each address must be monitored, supplied with funds, and integrated into the internal accounting system. The larger and more specialized a group, the more its structure resembles a traditional payment system with fixed accounts—and the more valuable the continuity of individual addresses becomes.
OTC brokers offer lower or no KYC requirements and the ability to exchange large sums without market movement—both of which reduce detection risk and costs, at the cost of dependence on a few „reliable“ contacts. A wallet is easily reproducible; an inconspicuous exchange account with trading limits and passed KYC is not—it is a scarce commodity. This scarcity explains why cash-out accounts remain identical across many unrelated cases, while upstream wallets vary. Offensive infrastructure is never random but the result of rational cost-benefit analysis—the real reason why patterns repeat and cash-out points converge.
The economic logic of the perpetrators is the real key to understanding their technical infrastructure. Forensic investigators searching for patterns are essentially looking for the points where reuse is profitable for perpetrators—and it is precisely there that the most compelling evidence of clusters emerges.
Wallet clustering assigns multiple blockchain addresses to the same economic actor with a high degree of probability — deliberately from a practical-investigative, not a mathematical-algorithmic perspective: How does an analyst recognize that multiple wallets belong together?
Infrastructure clusters persist even when the individuals involved change (e.g., staff turnover in operations). They are characterized by consistent technical patterns—the same wallet generation logic, the same bridge protocol, the same OTC contact—over extended periods, even if individual upstream wallets change.
The most reliable indicator is the demonstrable convergence of independent payment flows into the same pooled wallet or exchange account within a plausible timeframe. OSINT (identical communication patterns, website templates, payment requests) provides supporting, but not sufficient, evidence.
| Starting point | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Balance sheet analysis | Analysis of the inflows and outflows of individual wallets over time — the single strongest methodological component (Chapter 6). |
| Time correlation | Transactions occurring in close temporal proximity (e.g., multiple receiving wallets forwarding to the same collection wallet within minutes) indicate centralized, coordinated control. |
| Consolidations | Targeted consolidation of balances from multiple addresses into a single target address — one of the strongest cluster signals, as it rarely occurs without common control. |
| Cash-outs | A common endpoint for multiple chains at the same Exchange/OTC address closes the loop — often the decisive approach for information requests. |
Balance analysis of individual wallets is among the most effective, yet in practice least systematically used, tools—from the perspective of Finanz Forensik GmbH, the strongest single component of wallet analysis, stronger than any automated risk score. Instead of individual transactions, the entire account balance of an address is tracked over time, comparable to account movement analysis in banking.
Risk scores assess an address's proximity to known illegal sources (mixers, darknet, sanctioned addresses). A high score is a useful initial indicator, but it doesn't replace a thorough analysis. More informative is the actual balance sheet movement: When and in what amounts do assets flow in, when and where do assets flow out—and does this create an economically plausible pattern that aligns with the alleged use, or not?
These questions are not an end in themselves: This level of detail is precisely what authorities, public prosecutors and lawyers need in order to formulate a request for information, apply for an asset freeze or to provide a coherent basis for a civil lawsuit (Chapters 12/13).
The forensic value doesn't arise from an isolated transaction, but from observation: An address with no significant history grows to many times its initial inflow within a short time, before the entire amount is transferred to an identifiable exchange address. Rapid growth, sudden outflow—unusual for legitimate use, but the norm for professional pooled wallets. [Illustrative placeholder—constructed calculation example]
In practice, a thorough balance sheet analysis regularly provides more reliable evidence for legally admissible documentation than an isolated risk score, because it makes the economic context of an address comprehensible and answers the specific questions that investigators, lawyers and courts actually ask.
Not every exchange involved in the flow of funds is a worthwhile target for investigation—some are merely transit points. The crucial factor is the actual cash-out point: the point at which crypto assets are finally converted into fiat currency, other assets, or a marketable form.
Cash-out points are the point at which the anonymity benefits of blockchain end and regulatory instruments come into play. Unlike an intermediary wallet, an exchange is subject to KYC/AML obligations and is required to provide information. Since perpetrators are limited to a few payout points for economic reasons (Chapter 4), the cash-out exchange is often the key to identifying the real person.
KYC and AML require exchanges to verify identities and report suspicious patterns. In the EU, this is based on a uniform framework: The MiCA Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 has established an EU-wide licensing and supervisory obligation for cryptocurrency asset service providers (CASPs) since the end of 2024. Additionally, the Transfer of Funds Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, TFR) has required the transmission of complete originator and beneficiary data since December 30, 2024—the EU implementation of the FATF „Travel Rule“ (Recommendation 16), specified in the EBA Travel Rule Guidelines (EBA/GL/2024/11). If a cash-out address is associated with a MiCA-licensed exchange, an information request can ideally determine the account holder—and increasingly, the chain of previous transfers as well.
Many larger exchanges can temporarily freeze funds in connection with reported fraud cases. A timely, well-documented freeze request can prevent funds from being moved further before the conclusion of proceedings. Formal data requests (in criminal proceedings via mutual legal assistance requests, in civil proceedings via requests for information) are directed to the exchange of the cash-out address; the likelihood of success depends on the quality of the forensic documentation (Chapter 12). Assets seized can give rise to a criminal attachment order (Sections 111e et seq. of the German Code of Criminal Procedure) to secure subsequent confiscation (Sections 73 et seq. of the German Criminal Code) or a civil attachment order.
A topic almost entirely absent from the literature, but regularly encountered in practice: the recovery scam. In short, the second scam often begins immediately after the first and specifically targets people who have already been harmed and are emotionally vulnerable due to the original crypto fraud.
As soon as a victim becomes publicly visible (report, forum post, review on a fraud warning site, contact with a law firm), they often end up on informal "lists" of resold victim data. Anti-fraud investigators describe it unequivocally: Once a victim is known, a second contact attempt often follows—by alleged data recovery specialists (Chainalysis/Operation Shamrock, cited in cryptonews.com, Nov. 2025).
| Appearance | Proceed |
|---|---|
| Classic recovery scam | „"Recovery experts" proactively contact you, claiming to have located the data, and demand an upfront fee. After payment, contact ceases or further fees are charged. |
| Fake forensic experts | Perpetrators pose as blockchain forensic experts, present fake, technically sound reports and suggest a swift return of the victims — against advance payment. |
| Fake authorities | Alleged employees of the police, public prosecutor's office, BaFin or international authorities demand "release fees" or "taxes" for the payout of seized assets. |
| Fake lawyers | Allegedly specialized lawyers have already obtained a judgment and are demanding court/enforcement costs in advance. |
| Wallet Verification / Pay to Withdraw | Requests to send an amount for "verification" or an "unlock fee" before each payout — both only serve to facilitate further payments. |
Recovery scams exploit the emotional state after the damage: hope for restitution, shame about the initial deception, and the desire for quick correction significantly reduce the critical distance.
Reputable service providers do not demand upfront payment for a "guaranteed" result—an analysis can document traceability, but never guarantee recovery. They operate under a verifiable company identity (legal notice, contact information, professional experience), generally do not contact victims unsolicited, and document their findings methodically and transparently rather than relying on mere assertions.
The second type of fraud is not a fringe phenomenon, but a regular consequence of every publicly disclosed cryptocurrency fraud case. Raising awareness about recovery scams should be an integral part of every initial contact with victims—not a secondary, incidental detail.
The case studies are illustrative and anonymized. They summarize recurring patterns from many real-world studies without presenting a specific, identifiable case. [Illustrative placeholders — constructed case studies]
Case A — Four victims, one shared wallet. Four independent victims separately reported losses on the same fraudulent trading platform. Initially, the payment methods differed significantly (exchanges, receiving wallets, layering depths). However, analysis revealed that all four flows converged in the same centralized wallet after three to five intermediate steps—thus linking the initially unrelated cases to a single perpetrator infrastructure and allowing them to file a joint claim with the cash-out exchange.
Case B — Twelve wallets, one exchange address. Twelve seemingly independent wallets showed no direct connections. Only the examination of the final cash-out transaction revealed that all twelve paid into the same deposit address of a user account at a well-known exchange. This is typical of structures that deliberately obscure their origin at the wallet level but rely on a small number of accounts at the cash-out level (Chapter 4).
Case C — Multiple blockchains, one exchange. The targeted use of multiple chains via cross-chain bridges fragmented the analysis. Nevertheless, the same exchange and user account ultimately served as the cash-out source—an indication that cross-chain activity primarily obscures the analysis process and does not necessarily reflect a diversified cash-out structure.
In all three patterns, the crucial forensic starting point was not at the beginning, but at the end of the perpetrator chain—at the cash-out address. Wallet-based obfuscation at the upstream stages failed to prevent convergence at the payout point in any of the cases.
In discussions with victims, law enforcement agencies, and lawyers, Finanz Forensik GmbH regularly encounters the same misconceptions about the traceability of crypto transactions. Myth versus forensic reality:
An underestimated, yet legally crucial issue: the difference between technical control over a blockchain address and the legal allocation of assets — a recent higher court decision has given it increased practical relevance.
Whoever controls the private key has unrestricted technical access. This is distinct from the question of who legally owns the assets. A perpetrator who controls the key to a shared wallet, in which funds from multiple victims demonstrably flow, is not automatically the legal owner.
In a decision dated September 18, 2024 (1 Ws 185/24), the Higher Regional Court of Braunschweig (OLG Braunschweig) made a groundbreaking, yet ambivalent, ruling. A defendant had gained access to the seed phrase of another person's wallet within the context of a token project and transferred approximately 25 million units to his own addresses. The OLG upheld the Göttingen Regional Court's (LG Göttingen) lifting of an asset freeze (approximately €2.5 million) ordered to secure the confiscation of the proceeds. The court rejected charges of data espionage (§ 202a StGB – access data was known and used as intended), computer fraud (§ 263a StGB – a blockchain transaction does not contain a declaration equivalent to deception), and data alteration (§ 303a StGB – the data alteration is carried out by the decentralized network itself). As a result, the de facto appropriation through the mere use of a known key remained unpunished under criminal law.
Technical access alone does not constitute a criminally relevant "theft" or "deception," especially if it is based on known access data and only violates a contractual ancillary obligation (e.g., arising from a trust agreement). Anyone relying solely on criminal law instruments incurs a considerable risk—the civil law basis for claims gains weight. Regardless of the criminal classification, claims for restitution (§ 985 German Civil Code) and unjust enrichment (§ 812 German Civil Code) regularly remain available; while § 985 traditionally requires a "thing" (§ 90 German Civil Code)—a point of contention in legal doctrine—courts have already recognized quasi-proprietary claims for restitution and enforcement. For confiscation under criminal procedure (§§ 73 et seq. German Criminal Code), a suitable connecting offense must exist; if it is lacking, asset protection is not possible, and victims are relegated to civil proceedings.
Forensic reports should consistently separate technical findings („Address X controlled the power of disposal over Z units at time Y“) from legal assessment (reserved for the commissioning lawyers) — and be designed from the outset to support both criminal procedural and, in parallel and independently, civil legal claims under §§ 985, 812 of the German Civil Code (BGB).
The decision of the Higher Regional Court of Braunschweig (1 Ws 185/24) demonstrates that technical access to a wallet can remain without criminal consequences if there is no compelling underlying offense. In practice, this means that precise documentation of fund flows, understandable to non-technical users, is crucial for the enforceability of claims, not only in criminal proceedings but also under civil law—via Sections 985 and 812 of the German Civil Code (BGB).
A technically sound analysis is only effective if it is documented in such a way that it will stand up in court, before public prosecutors, or an exchange compliance department. Minimum requirements:
| Requirement | Contents |
|---|---|
| documentation | Each step of the analysis is documented in such a way that a knowledgeable third party can understand it without asking questions — complete addresses, transaction hashes, timestamps, tools used (e.g. Crystal Intelligence, Maltego). |
| Sources | Each finding must be traceable back to its source (on-chain observation, exchange information, OSINT). Established findings must be clearly distinguished from assumptions. |
| calculations | Totals, exchange rate conversions at the time of the transaction, balance sheet trends are documented in a traceable and reproducible manner (e.g., attached raw data exports). |
| Traceability | An independent expert must be able to independently reproduce the same analysis with the same initial data and arrive at the same results. |
| Screenshots & Hashes | Screenshots of explorers/platforms save the data state (labels change); transaction hashes are always in full text. |
| Chain of Custody | Complete documentation of who accessed which data and when, and what steps were taken — version control, tool versions, integrity checks. |
The following will significantly accelerate the investigation: the specific, named cash-out exchange including the deposit address, a reliable temporal correlation between inflows and outflows, and indications of further, previously unreported victims of the same infrastructure. Conversely, unstructured raw data exports without context, blanket risk assessments without justification, and speculation about perpetrator identities without solid evidence are of little help. Authorities benefit from precise, prioritized information—not from sheer volume of data.
Artificial intelligence will not only support cryptoforensics, but fundamentally change it — and the development is two-faced: it significantly accelerates investigations and at the same time the professionalization of the perpetrators.
The reality of this shift is illustrated by the perpetrators' perspective: According to Chainalysis data, AI-powered fraud operations generated an average of 4.5 times the revenue of traditional fraud cases in 2025—through deepfake videos of supposed executives, government officials, and influencers, as well as phishing-as-a-service. When perpetrators use AI for scaling, AI is no longer an optional add-on for investigators, but a necessary prerequisite.
Since criminal infrastructures operate across borders, success increasingly depends on international cooperation (Europol, Interpol, mutual legal assistance). The greatest impact arises where financial investigations, sanctions law, and prosecution intersect (Huione dismantling, Prince Group sanctions). Since the end of 2024, MiCA and the Travel Rule (TFR) have created a uniform, disclosure-based EU framework and should significantly facilitate the traceability of cash-outs between regulated providers; the treatment of self-hosted wallets remains under review. An increasing integration of OSINT and on-chain analysis is to be expected, as well as a growing role for private forensic service providers as intermediaries between victims, exchanges, and authorities.
Artificial intelligence is no longer a vision of the future, but is already an integral part of both the perpetrators' and the investigators' work. Any service provider, law firm, or government agency that fails to invest in AI-supported analysis tools will be at a structural disadvantage in the medium term when faced with increasingly AI-driven criminal structures.
Finanz Forensik GmbH specializes in crypto forensics, blockchain analysis, OSINT investigations and asset recovery — for victims, law firms, auditors and investigative authorities.
| Performance | What you will receive |
|---|---|
| Blockchain Analysis & Tracing | Tracing money flows via layering, cross-chain and pooled wallets to the actual cash-out point. |
| Wallet Clustering | Attributing multiple addresses and victim cases to a common perpetrator infrastructure via balance sheet analysis, time correlation, and consolidation. |
| Balance sheet analysis | Transparent inflow/outflow and peak level analysis of individual wallets as a basis for information requests and asset seizure. |
| OSINT investigation | Linking on-chain structures with publicly accessible off-chain traces of the perpetrators. |
| Report admissible in court | Documentation with complete hashes, source information, reproducible calculations and a complete chain of custody. |
| Asset Recovery & Cooperation with Authorities | Preparation for freeze requests, information requests, asset seizure (§§ 111e ff. StPO) and civil claims (§§ 985, 812 BGB). |
Court-admissible crypto transaction analysis, OSINT-based asset investigation, and expert reports for defense attorneys, insolvency administrators, and companies. Certified Crystal Expert (CECF, CEEI, CEUI).
We trace money flows via layering and cross-chain to the actual cash-out point, uncover wallet clusters, and deliver court-admissible reports for freeze requests, information requests, and asset seizures.
We expressly point out that the website finanzforensik.com [This company] has no business or legal connection to our company. You can officially reach us exclusively at [phone number/email address]. finanz-forensik.de.
We have already filed a criminal complaint and submitted the case to the relevant authorities. You can independently verify who we are at any time: Finanz Forensik GmbH is registered with the Hanau District Court under [number of names missing in original text]. HRB 100521 registered.
We provide you with the complete commercial register extract and our detailed documentation of the process here.
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